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on the Act, the Supreme Court restated
that the Act was constitutional and that
it required a broad interpretation to
protect citizens' equal enjoyment of
the right to vote. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at
827. Further, the Court noted that the
Act was aimed to protect citizens from
subtle, as well as obvious, state efforts
to deny the right to vote. Id.
The Court made clear that the initial step in analyzing claims under section 5 was to determine whether, or
not, the changes altered the election
law. Id. at 828. The Court found four
basic typologies indicative, though not
exhaustive, of section 5 claims. Id.
Those typologies involved changes affecting the manner of voting, the candidacy requirements and qualifications,
the composition of the electorate, or
the creation or abolition ofan elective
office. Id. As a general rule, the Court
said that a change must have "a direct
relation to voting and the election process." Id. at 829.
The appellants, joined by a brieffor
the United States as amicus curie, argued that the Common Fund Resolution fell within the Act's coverage because the value of each vote had been
diminished. Id. They reasoned that the
value of each vote decreased because
the authority of each commissioner
decreased. Id. Thus, the redistricting
system designed to ensure black representation became a token gesture.
The Court, however, defined voting power as being dependant upon
increases or decreases in the number of
officials, not in the individual power
an official holds while in office. Id.
The Court opined that without drawing
a restrained line between governmental decisions affecting voting and those
that do not, section 5 would become an
omnipotent statute applicable to virtually all facets ofgovernmental activity.
Id.
As to the Unit System, the Court
found that delegating authority to an
appointed official was possibly analogous to the replacement of an elected
official with an appointed one. Id. at
830. Nevertheless, the Court held that
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reallocations of authority within government could not constitute voting
changes. Id. Furthermore, the Court
stated that intraconstituency and
interconstituency changes in authority
may have affected voters, but neither
case presented a change in voting for
purposes of the Act. Id. at 831.
The Court also recognized that the
Attorney General's administrative interpretation deserved considerable deference, but noted that "[d]eference does
not mean acquiescence." Id. The
Court determined that Congress unambiguously stated that section 5 only
covered changes in the rules governing
voting. Id. at 833. As such, the Court
found the Attorney General's position
contrary to the Act and, therefore, not
entitled to a high degree of deference.
Id.
The Court affirmed the decision of
the district court but supplanted their
own standard that a change must directly relate to the voting process to
offend section 5. By making federal
law more predictable to the states, the
Court sought to enforce federalism as a
''practical system of governance and
not a mere poetic ideal." Id.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices White and Blackmun,
pointed to the definition of "voting"
given in the Act which includes "all
action necessary to make a vote effective." Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
Justice Stevens coupled this expansive
language to the historical deprivation
ofthe right to vote and created a litmus
test for deciding whether section 5
would apply. He concluded that whenever significant changes toward the
disposition ofpower were made after a
black person had assumed a position of
power not historically held, those
changes should be held suspect. Id. at
838.
It is likely that the Court will use
cases such as these as mechanisms to
federal restraint. By restrictively defining key terms, the Supreme Court
can severely curtail the social effects of
federal legislation. The Voting Rights
Act provided a system of quick review

of suspect changes in power. Such
claims may now be forced through the
more expensive and circuitous court
system.
- Brett R. Wilson
County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes andBands ofthe Yakima Indian
Nation: THE INDIAN GENERAL

ALLOTMENT ACT PERMITS
COUNTIES TO IMPOSE AD VALOREM TAXES BUT NOT EXCISE TAXES ON PATENTED
LAND OWNED BY TRIBES AND
TRIBE MEMBERS.
In an opinion delivered by Justice
Scalia, the Supreme Court in County of
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683 (1992), upheld and remanded
the decision ofthe Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals holding that the Indian
General Allotment Act ("Act"), permits a county to impose an ad valorem
tax upon land patented in fee, but does
not permit a county to impose an excise tax upon the sale of such land.
After reviewing land allotment to Indian tribes since the seventeen hundreds to establish the purpose of the
Act and how Congress intended it to
affect the Indian nations, the Court
concluded the Act was not implicitly
repealed by subsequent acts of Congress.
This case involved approximately
1.3 million acres of land, mostly in
Yakima County, of which eighty percent was held in trust by the United
States. The remaining twenty percent
was held in fee patent by Indians and
non-Indians. Most ofthe property was
located in Yakima County, Washington. Yakima County ("the County")
imposed an ad valorem levy on taxable
real property and an excise tax upon
the sale of the land held in fee patent.
When Yakima IndianNation, ("Yakima
Nation"), the owners, refused to pay
these taxes, the County attempted to
foreclose on their property.
Yakima Nation sought injunctive
and declaratory relief in the Federal
District Court for Washington State on

the basis that the Act prohibits taxes on
fee patented land held by tribes or
Indians. The district court granted
Yakima Nation summary judgment and
an injunction prohibiting tax collection. On appeal to the ninth circuit, the
appellate court reversed in part holding
that whereas excise taxes were impermissible, ad valorem taxes were allowed, as long as they did not have a
'''demonstrably serious' impact on the
'political integrity, economic security,
or the health and welfare ofthe tribe, '"
and remanded the case to the district
court. Id. at 687. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Court began its analysis by
examining congressional acts pertaining to the protection of Indian rights.
The Court first noted that in 1887,
Congress had enacted the Indian General Allotment Act in order to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries and force the assimilation ofIndians into society at large by
granting land to tribe members inqividually. The Act additionally protected Indians from having their land
fraudulently purchased from under
them by holding the land in trust for
twenty-five years by the United States.
The Court then examined the Burke
Act of 1906 which stated that Indians
and tribes were not held accountable
under state or territory laws until their
trust period had expired. Id. at 686.
Finally, the Court analyzed the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 which
ended allotments to Indians and emphasized tribal self-determination and
self-governance. Id. It further noted
that this Act made no attempt to undo
the allotment years by imposing restraints on the Indians' ability to alienate or encumber the land, or by impairing the rights of non-Indian title holders who held over two-thirds of the
allotted Indian lands. Id. at 687.
Regarding the issue of whether
Congress explicitly permitted taxation
upon these lands, the Court agreed
with the County's contention that the
Act gave express authority to tax fee
patented land upon the expiration of a

trustperiod. Id. at688 (citing Goudyv.
Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906».
The Court further agreed with the ninth
circuit stating that Congress "manifested a clear intention to permit a state
to tax" Indian fee patented lands in the
Burke Act. Id. (citingCountyofYakima
v. Yakima Indian Nation, 903 F.2d
1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1990».
The Court rejected Yakima Nation's
contention that the Burke Act was implicitly repealed by the Indian Reorganization Act based on Congress's definition of" Indian country" as including
"all fee land within the boundaries of
an existing reservation," held by Indians or non-Indians, and as preempting
state criminal laws within "Indian
Country" insofar as offenses by and
against Indians were concerned. Id. at
689 (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976». The Court also disagreed
with the Tribe's assertion that the Act
was impliedly repealed in 1953 when
Congress enacted Public Law 280
which authorized states in certain circumstances to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians within
"Indian country." Id.
Noting that repeals oflaw by implication were not looked upon favorably, the Court decided that the Burke
Act did not repeal the Act because the
Burke Act enforced the contention that
allotted land was to be "free from all
restrictions as to sale, encumbrance or
taxation." Id. at 690-91 (citing 25
U.S.C. § 349). Further, it distinguished
the decision in Moe from the decision
in Goudy, noting that Moe was based
upon personal jurisdiction with respect
to taxation upon individual Indians,
whereas Goudy was based upon in rem
jurisdiction which subjected allotted
lands to assessment and forced sale of
the land for taxes upon becoming alienable and encumberable. Yakima, 112
S. Ct. at 691.
Next, the Court addressed whether
the County's assertion of jurisdiction
over reservation fee patented land
would create an impracticable "checkerboard" effect with respect to taxation

ofland. Id. The Court held that parcel
by parcel assessments were no different from immunities and exemptions
used for the benefit of other groups
such as churches, the federal government and the states. Id.
The Court further held that state
jurisdiction over reservation fee patented land was not inconsistent with
the policies of preserving Indian selfdetermination and self-government.
The Court noted that while in personam
jurisdiction would be disrupti ve to these
policies (as they were in Moe), the
power to assess property and collect
taxes would not. Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at
692. The Court emphasized that the
legislature, not the judiciary, was the
correct forum to present these policy
arguments because Congress, not the
courts, had the power to repeal statutes. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974».
Finally, the Court addressed
whether the County's ad valorem and
excise taxes were valid with respect to
the reservation land. The Court applied its analysis to the County's ad
valorem tax upon land and held that
because this tax flowed from taxation
ofland within the meaning ofthe Act,
it was prima jacie valid. Id. With
respect to what Congress intended to
preempt regarding state taxation, the
Court held that aper se rule ofinterpretation must be followed which meant
that whatever Congress decided was
binding upon the courts. Id. at 693.
The Court then examined the excise tax the County sought to impose
upon Yakima Nation's property. The
Court held that excise taxes were not
permissible because although the object ofthe excise tax was the sale ofthe
land, the land in question was not the
object of the tax, and thus did not
invoke the protection provided by the
Burke Act. Id. The Court explained
that whenever there are two possible
constructions ofa statute relating to the
rights of American Indians, it was the
custom of the Court to construe the
statute liberally in favor ofthe Indians.
Id. The Court further held that even
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though an excise tax created a lien
upon the land between the time the
property was sold and the time the tax
was paid, this lien did not convert the
tax into a tax upon real estate; it remained a tax upon the Indians' activity
of selling the land. Id. at 693-94.
In County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act explicitly authorized taxation of fee patented land but
not taxation with respect to or involving land, or based upon the value of
land. As a result, counties are forbidden to impose an excise tax on fee
patented land. While this decision
clarified the limits upon which a county
may tax fee patented property held by
individual tribe members, it also deprived these Indians ofthe federal protection from state and local taxation
originally given to them by Congress.

- Carolyn M Brennan
Dawson v. Delaware: EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S RACIST ASSOCIATIONS OR BELIEFS NOT
ADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING UNLESS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE UNDERL YING CONVICTION.
In Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct.
1093 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that in a capital sentencing proceeding, evidence of the
defendant's membership in a racist
prison gang was inadmissible because
it was not relevant to the issues being
decided at the penalty proceeding or
related to the underlying conviction.
In vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware, the Court
determined that the admission of a
stipulation evidencing the defendant's
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution.
David Dawson and three other inmates escaped from a Delaware prison
in late 1986. After burglarizing a house
in Kenton, Delaware, Dawson pro24 - The Law ForumJ22.3

ceeded to another house nearby where
he brutally murdered a white woman
and then stole her car and money.
Dawson was subsequently apprehended
by the police.
At trial, the jury convicted Dawson
of first-degree murder, possession ofa
deadly weapon during the commission
of a felony, and various other crimes.
A penalty hearing was then held before
the jury to determine whether to impose the death penalty for the first
degree murder conviction.
The State notified the court that it
intended to introduce expert testimony
pertaining to Dawson's membership
in a prison gang known as the Aryan
Brotherhood ("Brotherhood") as well
as evidence of Dawson's tatoos and
other indicia of his membership in the
Brotherhood. The State submitted that
such testimony would explain the origin and nature of the Brotherhood.
Dawson opposed admission of such
evidence arguing that its admission
would be inflammatory and would violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Prior to the start of the penalty
hearing, the parties agreed upon a negotiated stipulation concerning the
evidence of the defendant's membership in the Brotherhood. In essence,
the stipulation stated that the Brotherhood was a white racist prison gang
which originated in California and that
separate gangs existed in Delaware
using the same name. As a condition
of the stipulation, the State did not
introduce expert testimony during the
penalty phase.
During the penalty hearing, the State
introduced the stipulation, Dawson's
tatoos relating to the Brotherhood, his
use of the name "Abaddan," and his
lengthy criminal record. In rebuttal,
Dawson presented mitigating "good
character" evidence consisting oftestimony of family members and records
of his enrollment in drug and alcohol
programs in prison for which he had
received good time credits.
The jury concluded that the mitigating evidence was outweighed by

the aggravating evidence and recommended that Dawson receive the death
penalty. Upon that binding recommendation, Dawson was so sentenced.
The Supreme Court of Delaware,
holding that it was desirable for the
jury to have as much information before it as possible during the penalty
hearing, affirmed the underlying conviction and the death penalty. The
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the admission of evidence concerning
Dawson's membership in the Brother-'
hood during the sentencing proceeding
violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional rights.
The Court began its analysis by
addressing Dawson's argument that
theFirst Amendment absolutely barred
the admission of evidence of an
individual's beliefs or associations
during a sentencing proceeding.
Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1096. While
recognizing that the First Amendment
protects an "individual's right to join
groups and associate with others," the
Court rejected Dawson's assertion because it was overly broad. Id. By
doing so, the Court reinforced its previous position that the sentencing authority is "free to consider a wide range
of relevant material," even that material which may otherwise be constitutionally protected. Id. at 1097.
Having recognized that in certain
instances otherwise constitutionally
protected material may be admitted
during a sentencing proceeding, the
Court then considered whether the admission of the stipulation as to
Dawson's membership in the Delaware chapter of the Brotherhood was
constitutional error. Id. at 1097. The
touchstone ofthe Court's inquiry was
whether the stipulation was in any way
relevant to the issues to be determined
in the sentencing proceeding. Id.
The Court first noted that the absence of expert testimony to show the
violent nature of the Brotherhood limitedthe relevancy ofthe admitted stipulation. Id. The Court reasoned that the
narrow phrasing ofthe stipulation said

